Canada’s Bill C-22 Puts Survivors of Gender-Based Violence at Risk

The Senate should amend the Lawful Access Act to protect encryption and drop mandatory metadata retention.

Canada’s Bill C-22 Puts Survivors of Gender-Based Violence at Risk
Julieta Longo & Digit / Digitalisation and Moonlighting 1 / Licenced by CC-BY 4.0

By Eva Blum-Dumontet and Audrey Hingle

Canada’s Senate should amend Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act, before it endangers the encrypted communications that survivors of gender-based violence rely on.

Bill C-22 aims to give law enforcement agencies faster and broader access to Canadians’ data to use in investigations. The House of Commons passed it on June 18, and the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs is now reviewing it. As an organization fighting against gender-based violence, Chayn is well-placed to understand the need for judicial systems to respond quickly when crimes are committed.

However, we worry that, as currently drafted, the bill would impose problematic data retention requirements on “electronic service providers,” which may include not only tech companies, but also any other person or entity that hosts a website or has an app. It could also threaten their ability to provide or use end-to-end encrypted services, in which only the sender and the recipient can read a message. As a result, C-22 would endanger victims of gender-based violence and a wide range of service providers aiding those communities, all of whom rely on these security tools.

The House of Commons amended the bill before passing it, however those attempts fall short of giving us confidence that this framework offers meaningful protections and legal certainty for the privacy and security that survivors of gender-based violence need.

Technical assistance orders could push encrypted services out of Canada

Part 2 of the bill, the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act, allows authorities to order technical assistance from electronic service providers. Those provisions could jeopardize the ability of service providers to offer encrypted services and guarantee the security and integrity of the hardware and software that operates their global networks. If software providers are forced to stop offering encrypted services in Canada, the security of everyone will be at risk.

Survivors need encryption to leave safely

Chayn’s core work focuses on supporting survivors of gender-based violence, and tech-facilitated gender-based violence in particular. Since our founding 13 years ago, we have promoted public education and advocacy about the essential role that encryption plays in protecting survivors, and women, gender queer people and children generally, across the world. Privacy and safety are two of the core trauma-informed design principles that shape how we work and how we design tools and content for survivors. Privacy and safety cannot meaningfully exist online without encryption.

Without encryption, it will not be just the government that will have access to communications. As EFF aptly points out, you cannot build a backdoor that only lets in good guys. Bad actors, including abusive partners, may be able to use the same backdoors to gain access to the communications of their partners, and intercept communications with shelters and those of us working to support women and children escaping abusive relationships.

The most dangerous time for a person escaping an abusive relationship is when they are planning to leave. For institutions that support survivors at these most perilous times, when they often still live with their abusers, using encryption is not optional. It is necessary.

Being able to protect the data and communications of survivors is a matter of life and death. This is why we worry this law could put many women, children and gender queer individuals at risk, as well as those working to protect them.

Exposed personal data already forces survivors to move. This spring, a searchable online database exposed the names and addresses of nearly 3 million Alberta voters. Kim Ruse, CEO of the Calgary organization Fear Is Not Love, said two people had already contacted her organization looking for relocation assistance.

People seeking abortions and refugees rely on the same protection

Encryption has been instrumental for women in other ways. As reproductive rights are under threat in different parts of the world, including in the US, encryption is the only guarantee that women who live in states where abortion is banned can communicate safely with abortion service providers outside of their state. In Nebraska in 2022, prosecutors used Facebook messages that Meta handed over under a warrant as key evidence in an abortion prosecution.

The risks to Canadians’ privacy and digital security do not stop at the border. Many refugees have chosen Canada to rebuild their lives, a country they saw as a safe haven for human rights. International organizations and activist groups operate from Canada for this very reason.

If encryption is no longer accessible or reliable, those very people who sought refuge in Canada will again be at the mercy of the governments they escaped. Hostile regimes will find ways to access the communications of those who oppose them from abroad.

Six months of metadata can cause harm without any message content

The other area of concern in Part 2 is the data retention provision, which treats all Canadians as potential criminals. It covers metadata: information about a communication that does not include its content, such as who is speaking to whom, for how long, how often and from where.

Intelligence officials know how sensitive that information is. Michael Hayden, a former director of the US National Security Agency and the CIA, said in a 2014 debate: “We kill people based on metadata.” Take a woman seeking to communicate with a shelter or an abortion provider. In the wrong hands, that information can be used for harm, even when the person or state intercepting it does not have access to the content.

Bill C-22 would let the government require companies to collect and retain metadata fields, including location data, for up to six months, even if they do not already log them or no longer need them for business purposes. Companies should not be compelled to build new technical and collection capabilities to indiscriminately ingest and store Canadians’ sensitive metadata solely for the purpose of assisting prospective government surveillance.

The more data is collected and the longer it is stored, the greater the risks of misuse, unauthorized access and mass surveillance. This is why data minimization — collecting only what is needed — is a core principle of how Chayn works and designs tools and technologies for survivors. The data retention mandate in C-22 lacks robust safeguards, oversight and strict limits, and as such, it will erode trust in digital services and put vulnerable groups at risk.

Laws outlast the governments that write them

When people’s fundamental rights are under threat, encryption becomes more important than ever. It enables communities to organize and communicate in defense of the freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, protected from interception or interference by those who seek to repress their rights.

Canada’s current government has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to its citizens’ rights — and to the importance of access to and adoption of strong encryption. But C-22 fails to ensure that the leadership of a future, less considered government could not abuse or misuse the law in ways that are anathema to the minister’s and legislature’s intent.

Let the US be an example for the rest of the world. Even when some rights seem set in stone — as abortion was with Roe v. Wade — we see now how fragile some of our rights are when leaders who are at war against the bodies of women and gender queer people gain power.

The countries with the most restrictive approaches to encryption and privacy include China, Cuba, Iran, Russia and Syria — hardly a group Canada has historically sought to align itself with. Canada has long played a leading role in advancing human rights, and the Charter stands as a testament to that commitment. It is precisely these values that must guide the evaluation of any new legislation.

The Senate should fix Part 2 before it passes the bill

Many of Chayn’s users are based in Canada, and many of them are from migrant communities and use our services in languages other than English and French. It is in that capacity that we join the cryptographers, academics, civil society organizations and companies around the world that are calling for changes to C-22.

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs should:

  • Protect end-to-end encryption explicitly. Amend Part 2 so that no regulation or ministerial order can require a provider to weaken, bypass or stop offering it.
  • Remove the metadata retention mandate. Strike the power in section 5(2)(d) of Part 2 to require providers to retain metadata.
  • Hear from survivors. Take evidence from survivors and the front-line organizations that support them before voting on the bill.

These changes are necessary for the safety of service providers and the survivors of domestic and gender-based violence they support.

Yesterday, Chayn’s Manpreet Dhillon presented to the Senate committee on Bill C-22, asking senators to consider what the bill would mean for survivors who live with the person harming them. Listen to some of her statement and read her summary of Chayn’s testimony on LinkedIn.


Mallory Knodel at ICANN’s Internet Governance Dialogue

IX’s Mallory Knodel was at ICANN’s Internet Governance Dialogue in Washington, D.C. on November 3, discussing what’s at stake at the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-26), which runs in Doha until November 27. On a panel with ICANN, the Internet Society, USCIB, and Salt Point Strategies, Mallory said civil society participation would be at an all-time low, with the least power she had seen in over 15 years. She flagged that transparency, censorship, internet resilience, cybersecurity, and human rights are issues to watch. Rather than simply trying to shrink the ITU’s mandate, she said she now looks for what states can do that no one else can. Still, she said, the conference had already been a success in many ways.

For a deeper look, read What’s At Stake at ITU PP-26, Mallory’s guide with Maria Paz Canales on how civil society can shape the ITU’s next four years, across AI, cybersecurity, connectivity and child online protection.

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